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As Professor
History of Philosophy
(Early) Modern Philosophy
In
this course we will consider the major philosophical figures of the early
modern period, with a focus on their metaphysics and epistemology. These thinkers grappled with the
philosophical implications of the rise of modern science and the decline of Aristotelianism
and formulated many of the philosophical problems that are with us to this
day. Readings will include those of Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Topics covered are wide-ranging; they include
the mind-body problem, the existence of God, the nature of thought, the nature
of space and time, personal identity, idealism, and the principle of sufficient
reason. [Fall 2008 (Wheaton College, MA); Spring 2008 (Univ. Oklahoma); Fall 2007 (Univ. Oklahoma)]
The Continental Rationalists
This
course is a survey of the philosophical thought of René Descartes (1596-1650),
Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), Benedictus (or Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677),
and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), generally regarded as the primary
continental rationalists. We will focus
on their epistemology and metaphysics.
Topics covered will include the new mechanistic outlook of the early
modern period, the notion of substance, the mind-body problem, proofs for the
existence of God, the theory of ideas, occasionalism, necessitarianism and
contingency, freedom, and the nature of space and time. [Graduate seminar; Fall 2007 (Univ. Oklahoma)]
The British Empiricists
This course is a survey of the philosophical
thought of John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume
(1711-76), generally regarded as the primary British Empiricists. We will focus on their epistemology and
metaphysics. Topics covered will include
the theory of ideas; the primary/secondary quality distinction; our knowledge
of natural kinds and of a mind-independent world; and the nature of and
justification for causal reasoning. [Graduate seminar; Fall 2006 (Univ. Oklahoma)]
Kant
Kant’s work, the Critique of Pure Reason in particular,
brings to a close the Early Modern period.
This period was typified by a faith in reason, which Hume’s work
dramatically questioned. In the Critique Kant famously sought to curb
the pretensions of reason but also to reign in skepticism about its
deliverances—to steer a middle course between rationalist metaphysics and
Humean skepticism. In this course, we
will examine Kant’s project, which includes the doctrine of transcendental
idealism, the transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant’s defense of the
claim that every event has a cause, and his criticisms of rationalist
metaphysics. [Graduate seminar; Spring 2007 (Univ. Oklahoma)]
20th-Century Analytic Philosophy
In
this course we will read and evaluate some of the classic texts of
20th-century analytic philosophy, focusing on the philosophy of
language, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.
Readings include texts by Mill, Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein,
Carnap, Quine, Sellars, and Kripke. [Fall 2009]
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Logic
In this course we will study
elementary deductive logic. We will
begin with sentential logic, which is the study of implication relations among
sentences where sentences are taken as the basic units of examination. We will then proceed to predicate logic,
which takes into account some of the syntactical components of sentences,
including quantifiers (“every,” “some,” etc.), names and definite descriptions
(“Gracie,” “the mountain,” etc.), and predicates, both monadic (“… is blue”)
and polyadic ( “… loves …,” etc.). [Spring 2010; Spring 2009 (Wheaton College, MA); Fall 2008 (Wheaton College, MA)]
Philosophy of Mind
This course is
divided into three parts. First, we will
consider the mind-body problem along with classical and contemporary responses
to it. Second, we will examine an
important feature of the mind—its intentionality, i.e., its ability to
represent the world—which will lead us to the contemporary debate over
“internalism” and “externalism” about the mind.
Finally, we will consider consciousness:
the special problems that it raises for a “naturalized” philosophy of
mind and differing accounts of the phenomenon. [Spring 2010; Spring 2009 (Wheaton College, MA)]
Metaphysics
This course is
a survey of some of the classic questions of metaphysics. Topics covered include arguments for and
against the existence of God, the nature of properties, possibility and
necessity, the nature of time, identity (especially personal identity) through
time, the mind-body problem, and human freedom.
[Spring 2009 (Wheaton College, MA)]
Miscellaneous
Introduction to Philosophy
This course is an introduction to the questions
and practice of philosophy. It is organized
around René Descartes’ Meditations on
First Philosophy (1641/42), although we will examine both historical and
contemporary texts. The course is divided
into three parts. We will first consider
the problem of external-world skepticism:
just how do you know that you live in a world replete with coffee cups, cars,
and other persons (after all, how do you know you are not merely dreaming all
of these things?)? Second, we will
examine arguments by Descartes and those of others for the existence of
God. Can God’s existence be established
by rational argument? Can God’s
non-existence be so proven? Finally, we
will consider the nature of the mind. Is
the mind a physical thing, or is it outside the ambit of scientific
investigation? Moreover, what are the
distinguishing marks of the mind?
Consciousness? The capacity to
represent the world? Something else?
Introduction to Philosophy [previous]
This course is an introduction to the questions
and practice of philosophy. After a
short introduction to logic, we shall focus on three philosophical areas: ethics (what makes a life good?; what is
morally right and wrong?), freedom of the will (is freedom compatible with
physical law?; under what circumstances is one free?), and personal identity
(in what does one’s identity over time consist?). This course aims to promote in participants a
better understanding of these important philosophical subjects; but it is
equally intended to encourage students to reflect on their philosophical views
and to help them write thoughtfully and critically. [Fall 2008 (Wheaton College, MA); Spring 2008 (Univ. Oklahoma); Spring 2007 (Univ. Oklahoma); Fall 2006 (Univ. Oklahoma)]
As Graduate Instructor
History of Philosophy
Book I of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature
Book I
of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature
is often regarded as a founding text for skepticism about inductive inference,
skepticism about the self, and naturalism in epistemology. We will examine what Hume has to say about
induction, the self, and (by the end of the semester) epistemology and whether
the above analyses of Hume accurately reflect his thought. We will also consider Hume’s so-called
“science of man,” his treatment of ideas and impressions, his analysis of the
idea of causation, and his treatment of our belief in the external world.
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind: Intentionality
A
feature of our minds is that they are intentional,
i.e., about things or states of affairs.
For example, I hope for a
winning ticket; I believe that it is
raining. Many philosophers have had the
project of “naturalizing” the mind, a project that includes reducing mental
states—such as my belief that it is raining—to behavioral states or brain
states or functional states. But in
virtue of what is a brain state (or some other natural item) about, e.g., the fact that it is
raining? And can the answer be given
naturally, i.e., without intentional notions?
This tutorial will be split into three parts. First, we will examine different naturalistic
accounts of intentionality. Second, we
will consider criticisms of this naturalistic project. Finally, we will conclude with consideration
of whether all or only some mental states are intentional (e.g., is a headache
about anything?).
Self-Knowledge
Historically,
philosophers have believed there to be something distinctive about our relationship to the contents of our own
minds. But they are divided over just
how to characterize this distinctiveness—even over whether there is an
interestingly special relationship at all.
This tutorial will be split into two closely related parts. In the first, we will consider competing
accounts of what, if anything, makes our relationship to the contents of our
own minds special. Although it is
natural to suppose that we are infallible or omniscient about what we believe,
desire, and feel, few philosophers today accept so strong a position. We shall consider other options. In the second part of this tutorial, we will
examine different models of self-knowledge and self-knowledge
attributions. Here, it is natural to
start with the model of the mind “perceiving inside.” But such a model has come in for much
criticism, and along with it we shall examine others.
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