Work in Progress

Kant’s Principle of Sense (currently under review)
Kant held that for a concept to have “sense and significance” [Sinn und Bedeutung], it must be possible to experience an instantiation of this concept. Call this Kant’s “principle of sense.” In this paper, I first argue, in Part I, that Kant’s principle helps us to understand the point of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: its purpose is to establish that instantiations of Kant’s categories do appear to us and thus that the categories pass the principle of sense. Part II of my paper is dedicated to explaining the meaning of the principle. It is most naturally construed as a semantic principle. I argue, on the contrary, that it is best understood as an epistemological principle, since sense and significance is best understood as an epistemological property. In Part III, I consider rationales for why Kant holds the principle of sense and conclude with a proposal of my own, a proposal that takes seriously that none of Kant's rationalist opponents would be inclined to accept it.

Kant and Naïve Realism
What is Kant’s theory of perception? In particular, what is for Kant the nature of the “mind-world relation” unique to the perception of objects? This paper is part of a longer project dedicated to answering this question. Here, my aim is primarily negative: to rule out a naïve realist reading, an interpretation that has an able defender in John McDowell. In Part I of this paper, I briefly stake out available readings of Kant’s understanding of perception. In Part II, I make a case for a naïve realist reading. In Part III, however, I show why such a reading ultimately proves unsatisfactory.

Kant’s Theory of Perception
This paper continues where “Kant and Naïve Realism” left off (although it presupposes no knowledge of that paper). After distinguishing, in the introduction, sense-datum from intentionalist theory, I consider in Part I how each fares as a reading of Kant. I argue that neither captures the various directions of Kant’s thought. In Part II, I defend a synthesis of sense-datum and intentionalist readings, paying special attention to Kant’s notion of inner sense. In Part III, I modify this analysis to account for his transcendental idealism, although I also articulate the difficulties that Kant’s idealism creates for (what I argue is) his underlying theory of perception.

Transcendental Idealism: A New Approach
Kant’s transcendental idealism implies that we can cognize things as they appear but not as they are “in themselves.” The distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves is perhaps the greatest sticking point in interpretation of transcendental idealism. On one school of thought, the distinction is ontological: appearances and things in themselves are two kinds of things (e.g., representations vs. mind-independent objects). On another school of thought, the distinction is perspectival: things exist, and we may consider them as they appear or as they are in themselves; but this implies no ontological consequences. In this paper, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of each broad school of interpretation. I argue that there is a plausible hybrid analysis, and I defend it against certain natural objections.

Kant and Autonomy of the Imagination
It is often said that for Kant all synthesis is “guided” by concepts. I argue otherwise. In particular, we cannot understand the Transcendental Deduction of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason unless we recognize his appeal to a pre-conceptual synthesis of the imagination.

Kant and Pure Apperception
more soon

Last updated August 11, 2008.